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Abstract Using macro-level trade data, we investigate how different types of sunk costs influence 
decisions of exporters. We find that exporters’ decisions reflect sensibly their desire to minimize 
the relationship-specific sunk costs. Specifically, exporters of differentiated products are more 
likely to reenter the export market than exporters of homogenous products. Also, the former are 
more likely to stay in the export market and exhibit more stability when doing so than the later. 
All of our findings are consistent with the view that relationship with their foreign partners 
matters more for trade in differentiated products than in homogenous ones. 
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I. Introduction 
Trade always involves buyers and sellers. Yet, the importance of the interactions between buyers 
and sellers is not the same for different products.  As Rauch (1999) pointed out, buyers and 
sellers of homogenous products – i.e. products whose characteristics are sufficiently similar so 
that within a product category prices exist to signal their scarcity – even do not need to know each 
other for trade between them to take place. Intermediaries such as organized exchanges are 
formed to help trade between buyers and sellers to occur. The existence of a reference price 
coupled with the fact that homogenous products are easier to be produced with the same 
standards and qualities by more than one seller causes buyers of those homogenous products to 
have less incentive to stick with a unique seller for ever.1
On the contrary, trade in differentiated products, which do not have any reference prices 
requires buyers and sellers be matched in characteristics space. Consequently, buyers and sellers 
must interact directly with each other in a persistent process before trade between them could 
finally take place. 2 Given the need for direct interactions between sellers and buyers, relationship 
between them plays an important role in trade in differentiated products. It is la raison d’etre of 
international networks that Rauch (1999) advocates: 
“I argue that this uninformativeness of prices prevents ‘globally scanning’ traders from 
substituting for organized exchanges in matching buyers and sellers of differentiated 
products. Instead connections between buyers and sellers are made through a search 
process that because of its costliness does not proceed until the best match is achieved. This 
search is strongly conditioned by proximity and preexisting ‘ties’ and results in trading 
networks rather than ‘markets’.” (Italics added) 
It is noteworthy that there is a scant empirical literature on the role of relationship in 
international trade. The first strand of literature is focused on the impact of networks or 
immigrants on the volume of bilateral trade based on the gravity equation. Rauch and Trindade 
(2000) empirically show that Chinese networks, as proxied by the product of Chinese population 
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shares, are found to have increased bilateral trade more for differentiated products than for 
homogeneous products. Head and Ries (1998) and Dunlevly (2006) look into the same question 
using trade data of Canadian provinces and U.S. states respectively. For their part, Besedes and 
Prusa (2006a, 2006b) examines the extent to which product differentiation affects the duration of 
U.S. import trade relationships based on duration analysis. They find that the median survival 
time for trade relationships involving differentiated products is five years as compared to two 
years for homogeneous products.  
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which relationship-specific costs as a form of 
sunk costs influence stay, exit and reentry decisions of exporters. We look into the role of 
relationship in stay, exit and reentry decisions of exporters because the theoretical framework that 
we are to set up in Section II suggests that relationship matters a lot in those decisions. Our 
findings confirm that it is indeed the case. First, exporters of differentiated products are more 
likely to reenter the export market than exporters of homogenous products, which is consistent 
with the view that good relationship needs to be revitalized. Second, exporters of differentiated 
products are more likely to stay in the export market than exporters of homogeneous products and 
exhibit more stability in doing so.  
Our paper is organized as follows. Section II sets up a theoretical model of firms’ entry and 
exit with sunk costs. The empirical methodology is presented in Section III. Section IV describes 
the data. Section V analyzes the results and Section VI concludes.  
II. A Model of Entry and Exit with Sunk Costs 
To motivate our empirical work, this section briefly sets up a model of firms’ entry and exit with 
sunk costs as laid down by Roberts and Tybout (1997).  Firm i’s maximization problem is to 
choose among options  (  =1 if firm i  is exporting in year t and 0 otherwise ) in order 
maximize the expected present value of its payoffs:  
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where  is year-t exporting profits of firm i. denotes the expected values conditioned on the 
information set  while 
itR tE
itΩ δ  is the annual discount rate.  
Firm i’s exporting profits in year t , which are adjusted for sunk costs, are defined as 
follows: 
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where itπ (pt , sit) is the difference between firm i’s expected gross profits when exporting and its 
expected gross profits when not exporting. pt  is a vector of exogenous market-level variables 
while sit is a vector of plant-specific state variables. and   are firm i’s entry 
cost with no exporting experience and its reentry cost when it last exported in year  
respectively. It is noteworthy that  is zero if we assume the knowledge and experience gained 
in earlier years are completely irrelevant for the firm.  if the 
firm was last in the export market j years earlier. Thus, it summarizes firm i’s most recent 
exporting experience. Finally,  is the loss firm i incurs when it exits the export market. 
0
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Bellman’s equation allows us to express the maximization problem of firm i as follows:  
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Given (1), (2), and (3), the behavior of firm i in year t can be summarized by the following 
participation rule: 
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    otherwise  (4) 0=itY
Similarly, the exit rule of firm i in year t is as follows: 3
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Equations (4) and (5) can be used to illustrate how firms’ participation or exit behavior may 
be very different depending on the type of sunk entry costs. A typical type of sunk costs is those 
that are independent of the frequency of interactions between buyers and sellers. In other words, 
the firm’s past experience is completely irrelevant for its current performance. If that is the case, 
entry sunk costs and reentry sunk costs in our model as laid down above are the same and equal 
to . It is reasonable to assume that exporters of homogenous products are faced with this type 
of sunk costs as they rely on intermediaries such as organized exchanges in order to find an 
importer and consequently don’t have to interact with the later.  
0
iF
In presence of constant sunk costs the two last elements in participation equation (4) 
disappear. Thus, in year t firm i does not take in account its past exporting experience in making 
its participation decision. In other words, all other things being equal, firm i is not more likely to 
reenter the export market in year t when it was last in the export market in year  than when 
it was last in the export market in year 
2−t
10−t .  
Sunk costs may depend on the last experience. This is clearly the case for trade of 
differentiated products in which relationship matters more. Sunk costs associated with the search 
and matching process are likely to be less when exporters have past exporting experience than 
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when exporters enter the export the market for the first time. Similarly, long absence from the 
market, which negatively affects relationship between sellers and buyers may substantially 
increase the sunk costs when exporters reenter the market.  
In presence of relationship-specific sunk costs, participation equation (4) shows that other 
things being equal, the firm has incentive to reenter immediately the export market to reduce sunk 
costs. In other words, it is more likely to reenter the export market when it was last in the export 
market in year than when it was in the export market in year 2−t 10−t . As for the exit 
behavior, exit rule (5) shows that the firm has incentive not to leave the export market in order to 
avoid sunk costs in the future.  
Given the above predictions of firms’ decisions, the two hypotheses we are to investigate at 
the marco-level trade data are the following: 
Hypothesis 1 an exporting country is more likely to reenter the foreign market of a 
differentiated product than the foreign market of an homogenous product. 
Hypothesis 2 an exporting country is more likely to exit the foreign market of a 
homogeneous product than the foreign market of a differentiated product.  
III. Econometric Methodology 
In order to investigate the role of relationship-specific sunk costs in decisions of trading partners, 
we first compute the following Balasa’s export-based index of revealed comparative advantages: 
                   1
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where X, i, j denote exports, country of the group of eleven emerging economies, and industry 
respectively. As in the previous literature, we use the following adjusted measure of Balassa’s 
index, which has its mean equal to zero and its values in the range (-1, 1): 
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 5
A country having AdjustedRCA  greater (smaller) than 1 in an industry is considered to have 
revealed comparative advantages (disadvantages) in that industry as compared to the average of 
the group. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the Balassa’s index and its adjusted 
measure. 
Second, we estimate, by the maximum likelihood method, transition probabilities 
separately for homogenous and differentiated products. The five states of transition matrices are 
exogenously defined as follows: 
State 1: no-longer-exporter to the U.S. 
State 2: high revealed comparative disadvantages (High RCD):  0.5AdjustedRCA < −
State 3: low revealed comparative disadvantages (Low RCD):  
     0.5 0AdjustedRCA− ≤ <
State 4: low revealed comparative advantages (Low RCA):  0 0AdjustedRCA≤ < .5
State 5: high revealed comparative advantages (High RCA): 0.5 AdjustedRCA≤  
For the purpose of this study a country is considered to be in the state of being no-longer-
exporter to the U.S. market at time t only if its exports are zero at time t and if it already exported 
to the U.S. market at a time prior to time t.  
Third, we estimate transition probability matrices separately for homogenous and 
differentiated products. The maximum likelihood function for estimating transition probabilities 
is shown in formula (3) where n i j is the number of transitions from state i to state j ( i, j = 
1,2,…m): 
 
1 2
1 21
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!( ) ....
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= Π        (3) 
 
This maximum likelihood function results from the assumption that for a given initial state i and a 
number of trials n i, the sample of transition counts can be considered as a sample size n i from a 
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multinomial distribution with probabilities , such that 1 2( , ,..., )i i imP P P 1 1
m
ijP =∑ . 4 Taking the 
derivative with respect to  and solving the system of (m-1) equations yields 
the following estimated probabilities:         
( 1, 2,..., 1)ijP j m= −
         i, j = 1,2,…,m (4) iijij nnP /ˆ =
where n i   is the total number of transitions starting from state i. 5     
IV. Data 
Data are available from the United Nations Commodity Statistics Trade Database (UN 
Comtrade). They are SITC 1 data of exports to the U.S. in manufacturing industries (1-digit SITC 
2= 5, 6, 7, 8) at the four-digit level. The sample consists of 14 emerging economies for which 
trade data are available with a time span of at least 12 years from the UN Comtrade database. 
They are Argentina, Brazil, China, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Venezuela. 6  
Since the Balassa’s index is sensitive when the group is small, we restrict the sample to 
SITC 2 four-digit classifications that have at least five exporters to the U.S. market. Finally, 
classifications of products in two categories: homogeneous products having referenced prices and 
differentiated products are from Rauch (1999). 7
V. Results 
Table 2 presents the five-state transition matrices for the pooled sample using Rauch’s 
“conservative” and “liberal” aggregation. Given our above definition of the five states,  is the 
estimated probability that a country after leaving the U.S. export market at time t remains a non-
exporter at time (t+1). 
11P
1 jP (j= 2, 3, 4, and 5) are probabilities that a country enter the U.S. market. 
Finally,  (i= 2, 3, 4, and 5) is the estimated probability that a country leaves the U.S. export 
market. The transition matrices of each country are estimated separately for homogenous 
1iP
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products (i.e. products having prices quoted on organized exchanges and products with prices 
quoted in trade publications) and differentiated products. 8  
As we can see from Table 2, exporters of homogenous products and differentiated products 
show systematic differences in their stay, exit and reentry decisions. First, the probability that 
trading partners remain no-longer-exporter after leaving the U.S. market is significantly higher 
for homogenous products than for differentiated products. When trade data of emerging 
economies are used the probabilities associated with the two types of products are 68% and 61% 
respectively whether Rauch’s “conservative” aggregation or Rauch’s “liberal” aggregation is 
used.  
Second, Table 2 also shows that trading partners are more likely to stop exporting 
homogenous products than differentiated products. For example, from one year to another the 
probability is 16 % and 8 % that an emerging exporter having a high index of revealed 
comparative disadvantages (High RCD) leaves the export market in homogenous and 
differentiated products, respectively.  
Third, after entering the U.S. market, both emerging and developed economies show more 
stability or persistence than their trade in homogenous products. Indeed, diagonal values 
 and ) of transition matrices associated with differentiated products are higher 
than diagonal values of transition matrices associated with homogenous products. In other words, 
a country is more likely to remain in the same state (i.e. its index of revealed comparative 
advantage does not change very much) after entering the foreign market of differentiated products 
than after entering the foreign market of homogenous products.  
,,,( 443322 PPP 55P
Thus, all of our findings about stay, exit, and reentry decisions of trading partners are 
consistent with the view that relationship-specific sunk costs are much more important for trade 
in differentiated products than in trade in homogenous products. Our findings are also in line with 
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Besedes and Prusa (2004), who find that the trade relationship involving homogeneous products 
is more fragile than the trade relationship involving differentiated ones.  
Robustness Checks 
As a robustness check of our results, we also estimate three-state transition matrices with the 
three states being defined as in Section III. Since we have relatively more transitions starting from 
state 2 and state 3 now we estimate transition probabilities separately for three types of products: 
products with reference prices quoted on organized exchanges, products with reference prices 
quoted in trade publications and differentiated products. The three states are: no-longer being an 
exporter, revealed comparative disadvantages (RCA<0) and revealed comparative advantages 
(RCA > 0). As Table 3 shows, the above findings still hold: trading partners are most likely to 
exit the U.S. market in products with reference prices quoted on organized exchanges and least 
likely to do so for differentiated products. Also, once they stop exporting, they are the most likely 
to remain non-exporters of products with reference prices quoted in organized exchanges while 
they are the most likely to reenter the U.S. market in differentiated products. Finally, while 
remaining in the export market exporters of differentiated products exhibit higher persistence than 
exporters of homogenous products as evidenced by the fact that the diagonal values of transition 
probabilities ( ) associated with differentiated products are significantly higher than those 
associated with homogenous products. 
3322 , PP
We also estimate transition probabilities for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand for the period before the financial crisis only. The results remain essentially the same, 
which confirm that our results are not sensitive to macroeconomic shocks.  
To check the significance of our findings, we also carry out the test for a specified 
transition probability matrix: Ho: P = Po. More specifically, we test whether transition matrices 
associated with homogeneous products are significantly different from the transition matrices 
associated with differentiated products and vice versa.  The statistic for the test is the following: 
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where the summation is taken only over (i, j) for which p o k l  > 0 and  d is the number of zeros in 
Po. All the statistics are significant at 0.5 percentage level. 9 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper looks into the role of relationship-specific costs as a form of sunk costs in decisions of 
exporters to the U.S. market. In a model of firm’s entry and exit with relationship-specific sunk 
costs, it is predicted that the firm has the incentive to stay in the export market or to reenter the 
export market shortly after leaving it in order to minimize the sunk costs.  
Using marco-level five-digit data of exports of 13 emerging economies to the U.S. market, 
we find that exporters’ behavior reflect sensible their desire to minimize those costs. Specifically, 
exporters of differentiated products are found to be significantly more likely to reenter the export 
market than exporters of homogenous products. Also, the former are significantly less likely to 
exit the U.S. market than the later. When staying in the export market, exporters of differentiated 
products exhibit more stability than exporters of homogeneous products. Our findings attest to the 
prediction that relationship with foreign partners matters more for trade in differentiated products 
than in homogenous products.  
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Appendix A: Product classification 
   
Types Characteristic Example 
 ----------------------------                       ------------------------------- -------------------------- 
                                                               Prices quoted on Unwrought lead 
                                                               organized exchanges              
Homogeneous products 
                                                               Prices quoted in trade  Polymerization and  
                                                               publications (“not branded”)   Copolymerization 
 
Differentiated products                          No reference price Footwear 
 
Source: Rauch (1996).  
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Appendix B: Data 
  
    
 Country Data Time Span  Frequency 
                        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Argentina 1983-2004 5037 
 Brazil  1983-2004 6113 
 Chile 1983-2004 4182 
 China 1987-2004 4799 
 Colombia 1983-2004 4624 
 India 1983-2004 5925 
 Indonesia 1983-2004 4019 
 Malaysia 1983-2004 5158 
 Mexico 1986-2004 6383 
 Philippines 1983-2004 4366 
 Rep. of Korea 1983-2004 6210 
 Singapore 1983-2004 5584 
 Thailand 1 1989-2001 4647 
 Venezuela 1989-2001 4471  
Notes:  (1) Thailand has data from 1983. But it has missing trade data for 1988 and 2002. So we only use 
its trade data for the 1989-2001period.  
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Notes 
1. See Appendix A for examples of three types of products.  
2. As Rauch (1996) points out, in the real world the matching goes from the sellers to the buyers 
and vice versa. See Figure 1 that I borrow from Rauch (1996) for a graphical illustration of the 
interaction between sellers and buyers of homogenous products and sellers and buyer of 
differentiated products.  
3. It is straightforward to obtain participation and exit rules. Given maximization problem (3) 
firm i remains in the export market if and only if 0)0|)(()1|)(( ≥=Ω−=Ω itititititit YVYV . 
Similarly, firm i exits the export market if and only if 
0)1|)(()0|)(( >=Ω−=Ω itititititit YVYV . Substituting (2) into these conditions yields 
participation rule (4) and (5) respectively. 
4. See Proudman & Redding (1998), for example, for more details on the maximum likelihood 
estimation of transition probabilities.   
5. In most of the previous studies on mobility transition matrices are estimated with states being 
endogenously determined such that the number of transitions starting from each state is almost 
equal. This has the advantage that we get efficient estimated transition probabilities because the 
number of transitions starting from one state is similar to the number of transitions starting from 
other states. In this paper, we choose exogenously states because we have relatively large sample. 
Also, it makes more sense to make across-country comparisons as well as across-industry 
comparisons within a country because the upper endpoints that define states are the same.   
6. See Appendix B for more details on the data time span of the two samples. 
7. See Appendix A for an illustration. 
8. It is noteworthy that Rauch’s “conservative” aggregation minimizes the number of three-digit 
and four-digit commodities that are classified as homogenous products having reference prices 
quoted on organized exchanges and in trade publications. 
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9. Results of our test are not presented in this paper but are available upon request from the 
author.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 Variable Observation Mean Standard deviation 
         ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Exports 71518 4.71e+07 3.48e+08 
  
 RCA 71518 1.773 6.580 
 
 RCA Adjusted 71518 -0.347 0.591 
 
Table 2: Stay, Exit and Reentry Decisions of Exporters 
 
Five-State Transition Probability Matrices 
Homogenous Products   Differentiated Products 
No of 
transitions 
 
 
State 1 
No longer 
Exporter 
 
State 2 
High 
RCD 
 
State 3 
Low 
RCD 
 
State 4 
Low 
RCA 
 
State 5 
High 
RCA 
  
No. of 
Transitions 
 
 
State 1 
No longer 
Exporter 
 
State 2 
High 
RCD 
 
State 3 
Low 
RCD 
 
State 4 
Low 
RCA 
 
State 5 
High 
RCA 
 
                    
Rauch’s conservative aggregation 
 
 N -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.00   N -0.5 0 0.5 1.00 
1880 0.68    0.26 0.02 0.02 0.02  2626 0.61 0.35 0.02 0.01 0.01 
3313 0.16 0.71 0.09 0.03 0.01  11156 0.08 0.82 0.08 0.02 0.00 
1279 0.03 0.22 0.51 0.19 0.05  4080 0.02 0.21 0.61 0.15 0.01 
1457 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.61 0.15  4040 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.71 0.10 
1574 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.79  2541 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.80 
Ergodic 0.20 0.31 0.13 0.17  0.19  Ergodic  0.11 0.44 0.17 0.18 0.10 
distribution       distribution      
 
Rauch’s liberal aggregation 
 
 N -0.5 0 0.5 1.00   N -0.5 0 0.5 1.00 
2158 0.68 0.27 0.02 0.02 0.01  2348 0.61 0.35 0.02 0.01 0.01 
3915 0.16 0.71 0.10 0.02 0.01  10554 0.08 0.83 0.08 0.01 0.00 
1572 0.03 0.22 0.52 0.19 0.04  3787 0.02 0.21 0.62 0.15 0.01 
1746 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.63 0.15  3751 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.72 0.09 
1758 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.79  2357 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.81 
Ergodic 0.20 0.32 0.14 0.17 0.17   Ergodic 0.11 0.48 0.17 0.15 0.09 
distribution              distribution           
 Notes:  (1) RCA Adjusted = -0.5, 0.0, 0.5 and 1.00 are the upper endpoints of state 2, state 3, state 4, and state 5, respectively.  
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Table 3: Stay, Exit and Reentry Decisions of Exporters 
 
Three-State Transition Probability Matrices 
 
Products with Prices Quoted on   Products with Reference Prices  Differentiated Products 
Organized Exchanges       
No of  State 1 State 2 State 3  No of  State 1 State 2 State 3  No of  State 1 State 2 State 3 
Transitions 
 
No longer 
exporter 
RCD 
 
RCA 
  
Transitions 
 
No longer 
exporter 
RCD 
 
RCA 
  
transitions 
 
No longer 
exporter 
RCD 
 
RCA 
 
       
   
Rauch’s conservative aggregation 
    
 N 0.0 1.00   N 0.0 1.00   N 0.0 1.00 
456 0.71 0.26 0.03  1424 0.68 0.29 0.03  2626 0.61 0.37 0.02 
722 0.18 0.74 0.09  3870 0.11 0.80 0.09  15236 0.07 0.88 0.05 
475 0.04 0.12 0.85  2556 0.02 0.13 0.85  6581 0.01 0.12 0.87 
Ergodic 0.30 0.42 0.28  Ergodic 0.19 0.48 0.33  Ergodic 0.12 0.62 0.26 
distribution    distribution     distribution    
   
 
Rauch's liberal aggregation 
    
 N 0.0 1.00   N 0.0 1.00   N 0.0 1.00 
535 0.73 0.24 0.03  1623 0.67 0.30 0.03  2348 0.61 0.37 0.02 
877 0.17 0.76 0.07  4610 0.11 0.80 0.09  14341 0.06 0.88 0.06 
500 0.04 0.11 0.85  3004 0.02 0.12 0.86  6180 0.01 0.12 0.87 
Ergodic 0.31 0.43 0.26  Ergodic 0.18 0.48 0.34  Ergodic  0.10 0.60 0.30 
distribution       distribution         distribution       
18
  Notes:  (1) RCA Adjusted = 0.0 and 1.00 are the upper endpoint of state 2 and state 3, respectively.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Interaction between Buyers and Sellers  
 
 
 
 Organized Market of  Unorganized Network of 
  Homogenous Products Differentiated Products 
 
                                   Sellers Sellers 
 
     1               2              3              4               5                    1               2           3           4           5 
 
 
 
Exchange Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        1                2                3     4                    1                    2                3                    4 
            Buyers                 Buyers 
 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Rauch (1996) 
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